Slashing
Last updated
Last updated
In addition to periodically distributing , Bitcoin Validated Services (BVSes) must also have a framework for punishing bad behavior. The most straightforward way to do this is to slash the assets which are controlled by the misbehaving party. In most cases, the slashing will be partial, or partially slash the operator's assets. However, full collateral slashing might be appropriate in sufficiently serious cases of misbehavior. SatLayer provides the coordination layer that enables networks to programmably specify the criteria of operator misconduct. This enables bitcoin security to secure arbitrarily flexible network architectures, greatly expanding the potential use cases for the bitcoin network.
1) Initiate the slashing request
The slashing process begins with the initiation stage. Depending on the implementation and slashing strategy, this action may be triggered by:
The BVS protocol
Middleware contracts
The operators themselves
⚠️ Note: This stage does not determine the validity of the slashing accusation. It only acts as the entry point for submitting a slash.
This is essentially a mechanism to report or raise suspicion about a potentially malicious or faulty operator.
2) Resolve the slashing request
Once a slash has been initiated, it enters the resolution phase. The logic and procedures at this stage can vary greatly depending on the network's design and governance model.
Social Slashing: In this model, other operators in the network may vote on the validity of the accusation.
Automated Verification Systems: any system which can determine whether a slashing event is valid or not objectively, such as a resolver contract capable of autonomously validating offenses based on objective criteria. When submitting a slash request, a slashing party might also submit a cryptographic proof of the misbehavior which can be validated by the resolver.
3) Burn Assets (if request is valid)
If the resolution concludes that slashing is warranted, the final stage involves the burning or reallocation of assets.
Direct Burn: The slashed assets are permanently destroyed.
Redistribution Pool: A portion of the slashed assets may be redirected to a community or protocol-governed pool, which can then be repurposed via governance votes or other mechanisms.
This stage ensures there is a tangible penalty, reinforcing the integrity of the network and deterring future misbehavior.
A slashing message first enters SatLayer through the bvs-router , which routes the message to the appropriate bvs-slash-strategy contract. This contract is responsible for sizing the slashing request and formulating the validation request to the resolver. The following information is passed to the bvs-slash-strategy by the initiating party:
network address
vault address
offence - specifying which of the slashable offences that the bvs-slash-strategy can handle is being triggered
data (optional) - data which can be used to prove that a particular slashable offence occured. Only used for objectively provable offences.
The resolver then processes the validation request from the bvs-slash-strategy and either vetoes it or submits the slash request to the vault.
For example, the resolver could be a bvs-slash-social-vote resolver which only submits slash requests that a majority of the operator set has voted for. In this case, the resolver would only pass the slashing request forward to the vault if the quorom and majority vote thresholds have been hit. If a sufficient amount of time passes before the threshold is set, then the request can be vetoed.
⚠️ WIP. Social slashing will not be live until the end of and fully programmatic slashing will not be implemented until the end of
